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“A Mob of Women” Confront
Post–Colonial Republican Politics
How Class, Race, and Partisan Ideology Affected
Gendered Political Space in Nineteenth–Century
Southwestern Colombia
James E. Sanders

This essay explores why some groups of women in nineteenth–century
Colombia were able to engage in public, political action but others
were not. Elite conservative women (mostly white) and popular liberal
women (mostly black and mulatta) found ways to participate publicly
in republican politics, but elite liberal women (mostly white) and some
popular conservative women (mostly Indian) were largely absent from
the public sphere. I argue that colonial gender roles, elite and popular
visions of citizenship, the contest between the Liberal and Conservative
Parties, the structure of indigenous communities, and popular liberal
women’s access to independent economic resources all helped shape
women’s abilities to publicly practice republican politics. Instead of
asserting that the rise of republicanism in nineteenth–century Latin
America reduced women’s political space, I propose that race, class, and
partisan ideologies acted in complex and locally determined ways to both
create male political subjects and open or close possibilities for women
to forge political discourses and practices for themselves.

I

n the southwestern Colombian city of Pasto, women representing the Conservative Party sprung a nasty surprise on the police commissioner who
had planned to read publicly the new Liberal constitution on 1 September
1853. Instead of finding a welcoming throng to celebrate the nation’s new
governing document, as the commissioner and his veteran force of national
guardsmen marched through the streets a “mob of women” confronted them
with a volley of “insults, sarcasm, water, and stones.”1 The commissioner
was a Liberal, and his new constitution, which guaranteed unrestricted
adult male citizenship for the first time in Colombia, was a product of the
Liberal triumph over Conservatives in the past elections and civil war.2
Wealthy, white male conservatives detested the new constitution’s assertion
of equality, under which no titles of birth, nobility, privilege, or class would
be recognized, and worried as well over liberals’ perceived anticlericalism.3
Pasto was very conservative, and the city’s elites, ever proud of their heritage and social station, did not appreciate these appointed Liberal officials’
political theatre; however, any disruption of the constitutional ceremony by
© 2008 Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 20 No. 1, 63–89.
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conservative men would no doubt have been answered with arrest or force.
Elite conservative women seized the public, political sphere in their stead,
and if the protestors failed to stop the reading of the Liberals’ constitution
by throwing insults, water, and rocks, they at least, literally, put a damper
on the festivities.
A few years earlier, women of a very different social position had also
stormed into the public sphere a few hundred kilometers north in the town
of Cali. On several different nights from 1848 to 1851, poor Afro–Colombian
and mestiza women and men entered the city’s commons (called ejidos)
to destroy fences that hacendados (landowners) had erected in an effort to
claim the land as their own private property.4 The commons were one of
the few resources that women, especially women who headed their own
households, could exploit. Some families had small houses and garden plots
on the ejidos; many more (over a thousand by one estimate) used the land to
pasture their milk cows and other livestock or to cut firewood further up the
mountainous slopes, selling the charcoal in the city for what little subsistence
it provided. Without these resources, one observer noted that the “unhappy
women wood gatherers” would become beggars and be forced to watch
their children starve. “Driven by the pang of hunger and their conscience
calmed by the tears of their children demanding sustenance,” the women
entered the commons and with “iron and fire” destroyed the new fences, reclaiming the fields for their families from the hacendados.5 The poor men who
participated in these raids had recently become popular allies to the Liberal
Party (whose elite members justified the fence destruction), supporting the
party as soldiers in the civil war against political conservatives that broke
out in 1851.6 The women associated with these poor, liberal men as wives,
lovers, sisters, mothers, daughters, fellow workers, and neighbors, whom
I call popular liberal women, were not recognized as allies by elite liberals,
but they still acted in concert with popular liberal men and would do so in
the future to support the Liberal Party. The women were so different from
their counterparts in Pasto—black, mulatta, and mestiza instead of white,
and poor instead of rich—nevertheless, both popular liberal women and
elite conservative women found ways to participate publicly in Colombia’s
post–colonial republican politics. Not all women found such ways to enter
the public sphere. In contrast to elite conservatives and popular liberals,
elite liberal women and many popular conservative women generally were
excluded from politics and public voice.7
The general consensus among historians of gender is that independence from Spain and the emergence of republicanism did little to increase
Latin American women’s status, political rights, or presence in the public
sphere during most of the nineteenth century, in some ways similar to Linda
Kerber’s analysis of the American Revolution and early U.S. Republic.8 The
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breaking of the colonial order signified no disruption in the patriarchal
family/political relationship; if anything, postcolonial republicanism may
have decreased women’s roles in society and politics. Sarah Chambers
has argued that independence and liberal republicanism actually reduced
women’s access to the public sphere, as public opinion was now the result
of rational debate by male citizens, with women’s former colonial role in
forming opinion now denigrated as mere gossip.9 Elizabeth Dore entitled
her essay on women and the nineteenth century “One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back.”10 Most would agree with theorists of French history that the
exclusion of women from the republican public sphere “was not incidental
but central to its incarnation.”11 Yet did all women experience post–colonial
republicanism the same way? May we assume that gender alone determined
women’s public and political lives? I will argue that the race, class, and party
orientation of women vastly affected their experience of republican politics
as well as their access to or exclusion from the public sphere.12 Beyond the
more frequently studied courtroom where family dramas played out for
those of all classes, some, but not all, women were able to engage directly
in political activity that men assumed they had reserved for themselves.
Of course, politics ranged much beyond the public sphere; however, for
this article, I wish to concentrate on public, political actions that were
recognized as such in the nineteenth century, actions explicitly directed
toward influencing the state or larger society beyond the family or community level (which while vitally important, and certainly “political,” are
of a different nature than public action).13 Elite conservative women (mostly
white and well-to-do) and popular liberal women (mostly black, mulatta,
or mestiza and poor) had the most presence in southwestern Colombia’s
public, political world, although for vastly different reasons. Meanwhile,
elite liberal women (mostly white and well-to-do) and popular conservative
indigenous women (mostly poor) found little space, again due to strikingly
distinct reasons.

Elite Women
Since I argue that political affiliation was key to understanding variances in women’s ability to practice politics, this study will focus on the
second half of the nineteenth century, after the Liberal and Conservative
Parties emerged in Colombia.14 The parties competed for power via elections
in a republican political system that was also punctuated by numerous civil
wars (1851, 1854, 1860–1863, 1876–1877, 1879, and 1885). In southwestern
Colombia, conservatives had long controlled both the institutions of power
and the region’s economic base of plantations, haciendas, and some mining.
While liberals tended to be less well–established economically and socially,
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many were professionals and artisans, and some liberal families were quite
powerful and wealthy. The parties agreed philosophically on many issues,
but differed sharply on the role of the Catholic Church in public life, the
importance of maintaining strict social control over the poor, slavery, the
meanings of citizenship, and, most importantly, who would be citizens in
the new republic.15 During this period, it is elite women with affinity for
the Conservative Party who most appear in the archive as political actors
in the Cauca region (the southwest of Colombia).16
One way wealthy conservative women could enter the public sphere
in the republican era was by using their traditional public roles from the
colonial period concerning charity and religion, which their powerful
families dominated. Elite conservative women led charitable efforts in the
region, distributing food and clothing to the needy, usually tightly linked
with religious ceremonies, and founding schools for girls.17 Conservative
men approved of women’s work in charity, as they believed such work,
tied to religion, helped the poor accept their place in society.18 Conservative
women also saw the founding of schools as a political act. In the run–up
to the 1876–1877 civil war, the conservative women of the Society of the
Sacred Heart of Jesus helped found religious schools for girls, so the children
would not have to attend secular state schools (secular schooling being one
of the sparks that started the war). The society also provided charity to the
needy, through their Hospital de Caridad.19 While the Conservative Party
controlled the national state in 1858, some of the most powerful women of
Popayán wrote a petition requesting funds for a girls’ school, which would
benefit “the civilization of woman and the cause of your compatriots.”20
The increasingly bitter divide between the Conservative and Liberal
Parties over the role of the Church gave elite conservative women the most
political space. Religion was a key definer of conservative and female identity, as expressed in a huge petition from Bogotá protesting attacks on the
Church by the Liberal state, in which the female writers argued that religion
defined the role of women.21 The Liberal Party’s assumption of power in
1849, and its expulsion of the Jesuits from Colombia the next year gave elite
conservative women a reason to act. Upon the announcement of the decree
in Popayán, four women wrote a letter of protest concerning the Liberals’
action and expressed the city’s appreciation for the Jesuits; over a thousand
people quickly signed. Religion allowed elite conservative women not just to
enter the political sphere as followers of husbands or fathers, but also to lead
their male relatives in action.22 The petitions, often stretching page after page,
organized by elite conservative women protesting the Liberal government’s
attacks on the Jesuits or church property attracted more signatories than any
other type of petitions in the Cauca region.23 Wealthy mothers in Pasto also
refused to allow their children to be baptized by liberal priests.24
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During the aforementioned 1876–1877 civil war, a war fought largely
over religious issues, liberals had arrested a priest who was participating
in the conservative rebellion and brought him to the state capital, Popayán
(a traditionally conservative city nestled in the mountains). Almost immediately, two crowds gathered in protest: one made up of the bishop
and priests of the city, and the other composed of a large crowd of women
and children. The women were “armed with revolvers, daggers, and even
forks.” A Liberal official decried the “fanaticism” of the women, who hoped
to incite the local militia into rebellion over the priest’s arrest. The soldiers,
however, remained loyal and eventually dispersed both groups of protestors. Liberals only saw the women’s actions as zealotry and contrasted the
irrational action of the women with the steady response of the male militia,
identified as “citizens.”25 Of course, the women were defending the Church,
but they were also criticizing liberal policies as well as playing their own
part in the civil war, if not as soldiers, then as demonstrators in support of
their ideas and male relatives at war. Religion and charity, while seen as
traditional, allowed elite conservative women to enter the novel realm of
republican politics.
With men away fighting or unable to act due to wartime restrictions,
periods of warfare especially allowed elite conservative women much public
space.26 During the 1854 civil war, “the noble matrons and the fair sex in
general of Cali” welcomed the conservative military force that retook the
city from the liberals, offering them numerous supplies due to their “ardent patriotism.”27 During the 1860–1863 civil war, María Jesús Barona, a
member of one of Cali’s more powerful and wealthy conservative families,
was accused of enticing liberal troops to desert by offering them clothing
and money.28 When a rumor of conservative success in the same war spread
north, a Liberal official had to arrest an elite conservative woman who “had
started to buy rifles and ammunition” to support the war in Cartago.29 Other
conservative women founded a military hospital.30
Finally, elections would seem to be the political space most closed to
women, as they were not citizens and could not vote regardless of their race
or class. Yet elite conservative women were active campaigners for their
party. Conservative men certainly assumed their female relations followed
politics, since they used women’s interest in a candidate as a mark of his
broad support.31 A liberal paper noted that some women “had sworn under
oath to attend the primary elections of 1852 with their daggers, pointed and
sharp, to kill any liberal who went to vote.”32 Conservative men approved
of conservative women’s campaigning, noting the success these women
were having in working towards the upcoming elections.33
An even more important role these women played was in countering
liberal efforts to mobilize the lower–class population in political clubs called
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Democratic Societies. The Democratic Societies were a great liberal success,
their poor members, many Afro–Colombian, becoming the backbone of
the Liberal Party. In the early 1850s, conservative men were stunned by
this turn of events, and seemed unsure how to act, as they had no desire to
mobilize the poor, whom they believed should refrain from politics. It was
conservative women who first began organizing societies for themselves
to counter the Liberal Party’s successful Democratic Societies; the women’s
example would be followed by elite conservative men, although the male
societies seemed less active or threatening.34 This activity bothered liberals
so much that the Liberal governor of the province apparently threatened
to dissolve the women’s society.35 Conservative men were impressed with
the women’s organizing, crediting the females’ society with forcing Pasto’s
Democratic Society to stop meeting, although the archival record is unclear
how they did this.36 As late as 1879 while conservatives prepared for yet
another civil war to try to displace the dominant Liberal Party, it was not
the men who organized themselves first into political clubs in small towns,
but rather the women.37 The aim of the women was to found a school for
girls, a profoundly political act with the debates over religious versus secular education raging that served as an organizing base for the civil war to
come, as it had in the 1876–1877 war.
Elite conservative women used traditional roles as charitable providers, pious churchgoers, or social doyennes to enter republican politics.
Conservative women socially enjoyed much power given the prestige of
their families and used this position to snub Liberal officials by refusing to
attend their dances.38 These women also created new roles for themselves
by participating in elections, civil wars, and founding republican political
clubs; therefore, we cannot only ascribe their success at entering the public
sphere to their appropriation of colonial roles. Conservative women also
managed to exert influence via new republican political institutions and
processes.39
The success of elite conservative women in entering the political realm
stands in sharp contrast to elite liberal women, who only make sporadic
appearances in the public record. Charity was less of an option, as conservative families controlled most of the region’s charitable institutions. In
one of very few recorded public appearances, “seven liberal ladies” placed
garlands of flowers over the heads of the newly freed in a ceremony that
celebrated the manumission of slaves (and linked that manumission to the
Liberal Party).40 As we will see below, elite liberal women had as much interest in politics as their conservative counterparts, yet they were unable to
publicly act on their political ideas. To understand this curious discrepancy,
we have to look at men’s gendered visions of politics as filtered through
partisan ideology.
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In general, it seems conservative men were more comfortable than
liberal men with women’s participation in the public sphere.41 Liberals
vociferously attacked conservative women, mocking them as “old, ugly
matrons” and claiming they were controlled by the Church.42 Liberals also
claimed that women really did not support republicanism but secretly
wanted monarchy, thus hoping to delegitimize their actions within a republican system.43 Liberals celebrated their own male popular liberals entering
politics by joining the Democratic Societies, and they mocked conservatives’ fear of the “equality” preached in the clubs. Yet these same liberals
denigrated conservative efforts to form their own political club, called the
“Society of Baby Jesus,” as their club was only made up of “noble and the
most important” women.44
Liberals also lamented that women would be corrupted by entering
politics. A liberal paper chastised conservatives for allowing women to
enter political clubs, thereby “degrading them.”45 Another paper warned
women to stay in their homes: “Your mission is the domestic life, the care
of your husbands and children. Look, mothers [madres de familia] while
you leave your homes to occupy yourselves in political conquests, perhaps
your daughters, those delicate little flowers, will hear the voice of the seducer.”46 Thus, women’s abandonment of the private sphere and their role
as republican mothers would only lead to the sexual corruption of their
charges. Worse, claimed liberals, since women would not be able to convince
men through reason and argument, they would have to rely on money
and feminine wiles to have success in the political sphere. This argument
formed the core of the elite liberal position—women lacked rationality,
therefore they could not be citizens, and thus they had no role in politics,
especially partisan politics (as historian Melanie Gustafson has shown for
the nineteenth–century United States, women’s entry in partisan politics
was particularly worrisome).47 If they still sought a role, it would only lead
to the corruption of their daughters, themselves, and politics as a whole,
since women would have to rely on sex, instead of reason—an argument
shared by republican societies across the Americas.48
It is not that conservatives were automatically comfortable with the increased role of women around mid–century, since it seemed part of a general
opening of political roles to include the previously excluded, which conservatives deplored. One conservative newspaper worried about the increasing
politicization of society, particularly the entrance of the lower classes into
the public sphere, which was also beginning to involve elite women: “Even
the fair sex . . . from whose lips there should not pass anything but words
of consolation, peace, and reconciliation, very recently, with few exceptions,
has occupied itself in politics, so intensely, with such vehemence.” While
this worried conservatives of “the strong sex” and while the paper aggres-
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sively condemned political action by popular liberal men, it nevertheless
supported this novel and disquieting action by elite conservative women:
“However, we do not want one to believe that we condemn the interest that
many women take in encouraging a friend, a brother, a son, a husband to
save their country.”49 Of course, the paper hoped to position this political
action in the context of supporting patriarchal figures in women’s lives,
yet conservative men’s view of women’s participation in politics sharply
contrasted with that of liberal men.
Elite conservative men were not so tolerant of elite liberal women, for
even if they made their presence felt less frequently on the public stage,
they still took a fervent interest in politics. During the 1860–1863 civil war,
a conservative paper chastised liberal women for supporting a party whose
program promoted “the degradation of women, the persecution of the
Catholic faith and the disrespect of Christian morals.” The paper described
such liberal women as liable “to commit more crimes against society than
the bandit” and “bastardizing their angelic mission of peace and charity,”
with the result that they would eventually be abandoned by their friends
and relatives to be alone in society.50 It is significant that the paper notes no
action taken by these liberal women, save an intense interest in the news
of the day. The paper described such women as desperate to hear the latest
word on the civil war and able to recite verbatim the proclamations of their
favorite politicians. Surely the paper would have eagerly reported if these
liberal women had taken to the streets demonstrating or insulting conservative men, yet the writer described no such action by these women. As
vociferously as the paper denounced liberal women, it did not oppose all
women in politics: “We do not censure the woman who adopts a political
opinion that agrees with her sex, her heart and her mission. Thus, not only
do we not condemn the conduct of conservative women, but, rather, we
applaud it and celebrate it for its dignity and good judgment. In addition,
if you think about it, conservative women have not embraced any political party; they have not done more than follow their natural inclination of
their makeup, defending what their sex has always defended, to wit, their
religion, their honor, their dignity.”51 As in the nineteenth–century United
States, men could celebrate women’s public activity as long as such activity
was cast as fulfilling women’s natural roles.52
How could conservative women participate in politics and not liberal
women? Religion and visions of citizenship are both key. Women had always had a public role in religious rituals and charity since colonial times.
Conservative women had entered politics to defend the Church and the
family, by protesting against the Liberal Party’s support of civil marriage—a
challenge to the institution of matrimony that united religion and family
life. As long as women were engaged in activities involving religion, char-
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ity, and the family, they could promote these traditional concerns in the
nontraditional sphere of party politics.53 Of course, while conservative men
recognized “conservative women” and supported and even celebrated their
actions, in the quotes above we see how they hoped to classify such action
as natural, as opposed to being political. Since conservatives controlled most
charitable institutions, liberal women could not pursue that path to political
involvement; since liberals sought to decrease the role of religion in society,
liberal women could hardly use religion as a means to enter politics.
Perhaps even more important were conservatives’ and liberals’ visions
of citizenship that determined who had a right and duty to practice politics.
Liberal thought allowed political participation for all citizens. Poor men had
already asserted that when they lacked legal citizenship (such as before the
Constitution of 1853), they could seize effective citizenship through political action, which liberals had to accept given their support for supposed
universal citizenship. Political participation, therefore, made the citizen
and not vice versa. This seemed to open the door to women, which liberals
promptly tried to shut by excluding women from politics. Liberal schools
regularly offered classes on “the rights and duties of citizens” to boys but
only very rarely to girls.54 While the Liberal Party was in power, the new
election code stipulated that any votes “given in favor of women” would
be considered null and void, raising the question if there had been votes for
women in previous elections.55 While liberals did seek to allow civil marriage and divorce, this did not mean they were prepared to allow female
citizenship or fundamentally alter male prerogatives as patriarchs.56 The
liberals’ 1863 constitution not only formally excluded women from citizenship, but also barred them from being “active members” of the state, thus
removing them from the public sphere.57 Liberals could not allow women
any political participation, as claiming political space would make them
citizens; they justified this exclusion, as we saw above, by claiming women
lacked rationality and independence.58
That the new republican politics broadened subaltern men’s role in
public life was disconcerting enough. Women’s participation threatened
the viability of the whole republican system in two ways. First, it made
republicanism simply seem too frightening and strange. Second, by making women equal, it removed them from the control of their husbands and
fathers, thus eroding the base of the citizen as a padre de familia. Most male
republicans feared disruption of the family, from which the male citizen
sprang, and therefore, constructed their citizenship by excluding women.59
Crimes of adultery and family abandonment were often punished with
harsher penalties (prison, fines, and even exile), including loss of “political
rights” for men, than were crimes of assault or robbery.60 Of course, men, at
least at times, received less harsh punishments than women for adultery,
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who could suffer public flogging.61 A congressional report on divorce noted
that marriage was the difference between “civilization and barbarism.”
For republican males, “domestic order [is the] fundamental base of public
order.”62 Both liberals and conservatives at best saw women’s place as republican mothers, educating future male citizens, which as other scholars
have shown isolated women from the republican public sphere.63 We cannot
underestimate how revolutionary the republican experiment was, but what
made such innovation possible was the security of the family and that men
would rule over women.
Conservative men had become comfortable with conservative women
participating in politics, but only because their actions did not threaten to
change the political system. By assuming that women’s actions were natural,
men were able to reassure themselves that women were not seeking more
political power, especially citizenship. Liberalism, however, only allowed
citizens to participate in politics, so it had to exclude women unless it could
accept them as equals (which did begin to happen later in the century).
Conservatism, not quite so bound, saw room for certain forms of participation for all members of society. Since conservatives imagined society as
inherently unequal, women could be allowed to participate in certain ways,
as it in no way gave them a claim of equal standing with men. It was not
that conservatives thought differently than liberals regarding women’s fitness as citizens. It was simply that for them women’s political participation
was not a claim on citizenship. For conservatives, citizenship was still an
inherited, not an earned, right, and women’s actions at that time seemed
not to pose a threat but rather to provide a valuable weapon against liberal
power.64 Ironically, liberals’ more expansive vision of citizenship, which
could include illiterate ex–slave tenant farmers, could not accept any public
political action by women.

Popular Women
If elite male liberals’ conception of citizenship and religion excluded
wealthy, white liberal women, how then did poor, black, mulatta, and
mestiza popular liberal women manage to enter the public sphere? They
mostly did so through a political repertoire of direct actions in the supposedly male–dominated “street,” including participation in demonstrations
or riots, or soldiering in war. Popular liberal women regularly participated
in demonstrations (perhaps called riots by the authorities) in Cali, marching
alongside men to rally support for Liberal Party candidates, to denounce
abuses such as the aguardiente (cane liquor) monopoly, or to simply show
the force of the Democratic Societies.65 They also had recourse to petitions,
although most often, as with demonstrations or riots, they did so in concert
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with popular liberal men. They could act in the public sphere independently
of men as well, unlike poor Indian women, whose villages developed a vision of popular conservatism in order to protect their communal landholding and governance from liberal individualism. Popular liberal women’s
relative independence from male control, compared to elite liberal women
and popular conservative women, was the key factor that allowed them
to enter the public sphere.
Just like elite conservative women, popular liberal women also participated in warfare or revolts, not through provisioning male troops or
establishing hospitals, but often as agents on the field of battle.66 In the early
1850s, popular liberals went beyond knocking over fences, as we saw in the
opening vignettes, to physically attacking conservatives and their haciendas.
While men mostly participated in these invasions, women did as well, and
some were arrested from time to time.67 During the 1854 civil war, women
were held as spies against the Conservative government, accused of hiding
soldiers in their houses, and after the war, they were arrested for joining
bandit gangs (what conservatives called “liberal guerrillas”).68 Following
the war, in one case eleven women abetted the jailbreak of liberal rebels
(some identified as “black”) held by the Conservative state government.69
In 1856, women were accused of being spies and smuggling arms to the
popular, liberal, Afro–Colombian guerrilla leader Manuel María Victoria.70
In the 1860–1863 civil war, a Liberal official in a region with much popular
liberal support noted that “even the women want to take up arms in defense
of the government.”71 Lower–class women ran a great risk, as conservatives
treated poor prisoners, especially those of African descent, harshly. Liberals accused conservatives of forcing “poor black women,” charged with
supporting popular liberal bands, to flee their homes by foot and “almost
naked.”72 Worse, conservatives tortured “poor women” by hanging them
in the air upside down by their ankles; such brutality “offended decency
and morality.”73
Perhaps during the sack of Cali in the 1876–1877 conflict, popular liberal
women participated in public politics more dramatically than they ever had
before. Conservatives seized Cali in a surprise uprising. Popular liberals
hurried to retake the city, urged on by their female relations: “Women encouraged their husbands and brothers to the battle, mothers returned to the
campaign their deserter children.”74 The women not only cheered on their
compatriots, but also accompanied them, retaking the city for the liberals
and participating in the looting of conservatives’ property.75
While in some ways action during war was the most transgressive,
popular liberal women most regularly claimed the public sphere in disputes
over aguardiente; many poor women, especially those of African descent,
often distilled and sold liquor. Taverns were an important site of subaltern
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political activity, where men and women (especially the owners/barkeeps)
discussed the events of the day and where visions of popular liberalism for
both men and women developed.76 In the 1880s, a traveler noted the local
pulpería (tavern), run by a woman, was a center of discussion and gossip.77
Of course, taverns also gave women an important economic resource they
sought to defend. Some “miserable women” petitioned the state to lower
taxes on aguardiente, noting that only poor people engaged in such commerce, transporting “four or six bottles” to Cali, which only earned two or
three pesos a month once peddled.78 Women alone signed this petition.
Disputes over aguardiente often led women into confrontations with
authorities who hoped to tax or limit such entrepreneurship. In the village
of La Cruz, “an immense mob of men and women” confronted the mayor
who was trying to stop contraband liquor sales.79 While the official described
a mob, another way of thinking about the activity of these poor men and
women would be a demonstration, designed to convince more senior authorities of the injustice of the local liquor monopoly.80 Many inhabitants
of La Cruz defended the liquor producers as “wretched people,” trying
to provide food for their children, and lamented the violent actions of the
monopoly holders against “a poor and defenseless woman” who needed
to sell liquor to survive.81 Similarly, an anonymous and threatening letter
sent to the Conservative Party leader Sergio Arboleda, accused him of “taking away from poor women the only industry that they work in order to
survive” when he tried to keep them from producing aguardiente as he held
monopoly privileges. The writers warned, “It is better to steal 500,000 or
more pesos from the government than to make war on women.”82 Popular
liberal men and women often worked together to ensure the rights—be they
to land, industry, or liberty—that they needed to survive.83 When it came
time, however, to legally address the state and Liberal Party via petitions—as
opposed to active demonstrations—women were almost always excluded
since they were not citizens. It was popular liberal men in the Democratic
Societies who demanded the state allow freedom to sell aguardiente, “the
only industry of our women.”84 Elite liberals often accepted these appeals,
since they philosophically opposed monopolies on liquor production and
sale as a block on freedom of industry and since Conservatives traditionally
had controlled said monopolies.
In spite of the various ways popular liberal women entered the political sphere, they generally could not claim the vital mantle of citizenship,
with a few notable exceptions. In a petition signed by eight women to
the municipal government, although written by a man, the undersigned
described themselves as “citizens [ciudadanas] of Colombia.” The women
sold cane liquor off Cali’s main square and were protesting a new tax on
their establishments, which they described as “very poor.” They argued
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they should not be taxed as they had no capital beyond a few bottles of
liquor and some tobacco, and because “they have suffered exile and a
thousand persecutions for their loyalty to the noble cause of Liberty.”85
While we cannot be sure of the social class or even political sympathies
of the women, that they sold aguardiente (a profession dominated in Cali
by poor women, especially those of African descent) and used a language
designed to appeal to liberals, suggest they were popular liberals (male
popular liberals—many of African descent—often defended the rights of
women to sell liquor in their Democratic Societies, as we have seen). That
the women could hire a lawyer or at least a scribe and that they rented
rather prominent taverns, which, even if they were still barkeeps, suggest
perhaps a slightly higher class. While their personal circumstances are
unclear, these women’s efforts reveal how popular liberal women appropriated the language of citizenship and liberty from the popular liberal men
who drank in their bars. Certainly, as we have seen, popular liberal women
were the most active participants in politics of all lower–class women in
the region. It would have been tempting for them, especially given the
sacrifices made by all popular liberals in the 1860–1863 civil war, to assert
claims on the state due to their status as citizens. This strategy would not
succeed in general—popular liberal women, unlike the same class of men,
were not successful in claiming citizenship—although these eight women
did succeed in having the liquor tax overturned!86
A petition such as this was very rare. More common was one signed by
poor women and men in Cali complaining about the city closing a stream
they used for water. Their argument centers not on rights to the water but on
a claim of custom going back to the founding of the city.87 By looking back
to the past, and not asserting a political right as citizens, women could play
a role denied them in the more common petitions from Cali’s male poor,
which demanded action based on their rights as citizens and defenders of the
Liberal Party. Other petitions from women focused on family relationships
as a justification for their raised voices. A liberal paper printed a petition
asking for pensions for “widows, sisters and mothers of Caucano soldiers,
sacrificed in defense of the rights of the pueblo.”88 Popular liberal women,
who, while excluded from joining the Democratic Societies, could petition
the influential Democráticas to represent them—as did sixteen women who
wrote to the president of Cali’s Democratic Society to ask him to intercede
with the government on their behalf to secure the pensions owed to them
since their husbands’ deaths in fighting for the Liberal Party in the past
civil wars.89 These women’s political action had to be filtered, however,
first through their relationship to liberal men (even if these men were dead)
and through the male, if popular liberal, Democratic Society. The Liberal
Party’s norms of political action were denied to them, as they were not
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recognized as citizens. In general, all women of this time period had to
channel their political actions and demands around issues of the general
or familial good or through the discourses of the two political parties; we
do not yet see openly feminist movements demanding women’s rights,
which tended not to emerge in Latin America until the late nineteenth or
early twentieth century.90
When female aguardiente producers petitioned the Liberal government
without the support of popular liberal men in the Democratic Societies,
their petition was soundly rejected by the state (although liberals had often
supported similar petitions by men on behalf of women).91 Yet if their cause
could be linked to popular liberal men, then they had a greater chance of
success. A Liberal Party legislator demanded the repeal of a law taxing
aguardiente, as it hurt “poor women,” especially since they bore “the honorable titles of mothers, sisters, and wives of those innumerable patriots who
without any pretensions to personal gain came generously offering their
blood on the sacred altar of Liberty and the Republic since 1810.”92 Women
deserved recompense and political consideration due to the sacrifices made
by their male relatives to the nation and especially to the Liberal Party.
As a whole, the discourse of popular liberalism still envisioned a male
political subject. Unlike elite conservatives who saw citizenship as based on
social status and elite liberals who saw it as a right conditioned by rationality, for male popular liberals service to the state and party created the good
citizen, and women could rarely perform such services. Women legally were
not citizens and therefore could not support the Party with votes. Possibly
more important from the standpoint of popular liberalism, men shed their
blood in wars against the rich, the conservative, and the otherwise bad
citizens. Thus, the armed citizen became central to popular liberals as it
gave them a new public identity that elite liberals recognized. Although
women did play a role in wars, as we saw above, it was informal—they
were not officially recognized as soldiers. By making the armed citizen so
important to popular liberal political identity, men excluded women from
the equality they themselves held so dear. That said, women ran the taverns
where popular liberals met and talked politics, participated in protesting
the aguardiente monopolies, and tore down fences in the ejidos alongside
men. Nonetheless, they remained ideologically excluded from the liberal
conception of politics and public life.
While popular liberal women’s relation with the ideas of citizenship
limited their ultimate inclusion, they still managed a much more active
role in the public sphere than some other female subalterns in the region,
namely Indians. In the state archive, among hundreds of petitions sent
by Indians, I only found one that included female signatories, concerning
the return of three Indians jailed for perjury so they could continue their
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work as teachers.93 Unlike popular liberal women who appear in public, in
political space that is constantly in the historical record, Indian women are
almost entirely absent. This is not to say that poor Indian women had no
interest in politics or played no internal role in their communities’ political
decisions—they certainly did and this familial or community political action was no doubt vital. Yet they could not enter the public, political sphere
since they had to act through their patriarchal villages.
Indian men employed a discourse of patriarchal authority to justify
their role as leaders of their communities and citizens with a right to place
demands on the state and nation.94 The construction of this patriarchal
authority was based on two intertwined institutions: communal landholding (called resguardos) and the family. Indian officials, acting through the
cabildos pequeños (councils chosen or elected by villages) of Túquerres and
Ipiales, who represented all of the parcialidades (subdivisions of a resguardo
usually representing a village) of the area, explicitly linked their resguardos
with family life: “Communal property in our class is not prejudicial, but,
rather, advantageous, because by conserving it, one also conserves our
domestic relations, so that there never will appear among us the horrible
monster of discord.”95
Like the father of the individual family, the cabildo pequeño assumed
patriarchal power over the “family” of the Indian community as a whole. A
coalition of Indians explained the link between patriarchy and their resguardos in a metaphor, “Our parcialidades, Honorable Deputies, are like a family
that lives under one father.”96 Patriarchal power and political subjectivity
were tied together. When the village of Guachavéz lost its status as a parish,
and therefore its men lost leadership positions, the moral life of the village
declined. Before their power was taken away, they noted that “the habits of
disorder and libertinism, that are so common in places where the immediate
weight of authority is not felt, became habits of obedience, all the inhabitants
respecting the lowliest constable as much as the ultimate local authority.”97
Male indigenous leaders used a language of domestic harmony through
family life to both maintain consensus in villages with internal divisions
and to claim political legitimacy in the public sphere.98 These men warned
of the consequences if they lost their positions: “Without the authority of
their governors, their town councilors [regidores], and their mayors [alcaldes]
who incessantly and daily keep vigil over each house, each family, each
individual Indian, they would lose themselves in their passions, and very
soon, the customary links of union, order, and obedience broken, they would
commit the most atrocious crimes.”99 Indigenous leaders linked their ability
to control and regulate the moral and family life of their villages—to be,
in other words, wise, powerful, and controlling fathers—to their rights to
enter the political sphere as representatives of their communities.100
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Yet did male popular liberals not share similar gendered visions of
citizenship? Their elite allies certainly did. Popular liberals, however, did
not imagine citizenship as constructed on the backs of the family. Popular
liberals mentioned families much less in their discourse than did indigenous
villagers. The good citizen did not have to be married and no patriarchal
figure controlled their communities as in Indian villages. Instead, as we
saw above, the armed citizen, serving the nation and party, earned citizenship for popular liberals. This too was gendered, even if in a very distinct
way that nevertheless excluded women. However, the lack of male family
control, reflected in the distinct gendered visions of citizenship, did allow
popular liberal women much more political space than their indigenous
counterparts.
Popular liberal men seemed much less able to exercise control over
popular liberal women than indigenous officers. Since most popular liberals did not own land (the commons were not individual property) or not
enough to support a family, male land ownership did not lend itself to
gender control. Also, some Afro–Colombian women had an independent
economic resource in small–scale liquor production and sale, a resource
popular liberal men were more than willing to defend. Unlike the constant legal battles in which Indians engaged to protect their land, wherein
women did not play a public role, popular liberal women did act with
men to try to gain access to landholding, as we saw most powerfully with
the destruction of fences in Cali’s ejido. They also signed petitions with
men, again something largely unseen with Indians. In Cali, women not
only destroyed fences to secure the commons, but entered the legal realm
as well, signing demands for land in the ejido along with men.101 In the
coastal region of San Juan, popular liberal women signed a petition with
men claiming land rights; they described themselves as some “farmers
desiring work, but without land” who had occupied some uncultivated
land and now wanted title. Since popular liberal women were more likely
than indigenous women to head households, and own or at least manage
commons land, they would have been in a position to include themselves
in petitions for land rights.102
Finally, although the evidence is far from conclusive, on the city commons that popular liberals did exploit, women seemed to control a good
amount of the land, often heading their own households. In 1866, a partial
census of Cali’s ejido listed 166 plots of land. Of these, single women (or
at least no male relation listed) controlled seventy–four of the plots (44
percent) and most women had children. Only twenty–six two–parent
households were listed (16 percent). The remaining plots were occupied
by single men or multiple users (40 percent). Other fragmentary evidence
of the ejido does not show women controlling as much land, but they are
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represented as heading farming households with no male present.103 These
independent women faced intense pressure, including from elite families,
especially conservatives, who claimed the women’s small farms were
frequented by “drinkers and vagabonds,” and whose progeny should be
removed to “honorable homes in order to prevent the corruption of these
poor children.”104
While women in indigenous villages running their own farms were
seen as a deviation from the ideal, their actions were usually the result of
being widowed. Around Cali, female–headed households seemed to be
much more the norm, and thus the family ideal, and the patriarchal male
citizen seemed less powerful. Popular liberal women had much more independence than other subaltern women and correspondingly participated
more overtly and regularly in the region’s politics.

Gender and Republican Political Culture
In spite of the formal exclusion of women from the political system,
gender affected all aspects of nineteenth–century republican politics. This
article has focused on how women of different social standings and ideological camps managed or failed to enter the public, political sphere, in which
they were supposed to play no direct role. Instead of assuming a unity of
experience for women, the archive reveals that possibilities varied greatly
depending on class, race, and whether one was liberal or conservative.
Class was vitally important: Colombia, with such a weak middle class in
the nineteenth century, demands that the scholar, as historian Paula Baker
has suggested is necessary, move beyond a study of middle–class women.
By doing so, however, one does not find “a distinct nineteenth–century
women’s political culture” as Baker did for middle–class women in the
United States, but rather a complex multiplicity of political cultures created by women of different classes, races, and political parties, influencing
and influenced by male political culture.105 Perhaps not surprisingly, elite
women, whose husbands, brothers, and sons controlled the two political
parties, had great advantages for entering the political realm; however,
not all elite women were able to do so. Liberals’ vision of citizenship as
the ultimate political identity prevented women from playing much of a
role, since they were not citizens. Because conservatives saw citizenship as
naturally closed to most people, including women, female participation in
politics was more tolerable, perhaps even welcome, especially if oriented
around traditional, colonial religious or charitable space women had long
claimed as their own. Conservative women made impressive use of this
political opening, often acting well ahead of male relatives in responding
to the Liberal Party’s initiatives.
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It would seem that lower–class women, with so few resources, would
have fewer public roles, but popular liberal women belied that assumption by demonstrating, fighting, rioting, and petitioning alongside, or even
independently of, men. Again, however, not all lower–class women had
the same options. Indians’ distinct communities had specific gendered
constructions of male political identity, which acted to limit women’s public
participation in politics. Here party ideology seems less important. Indians
mostly supported the Conservative Party in the 1850s, but by the 1860s
were generally not tightly allied with either party.
What seems key is that indigenous villages had an organizational structure and discursive ideology dominated by the male village officer. Popular
liberals did not tend to control their own independent villages and thus,
had no organizations that men dominated. Popular liberal women had more
control over resources, be it land in the commons or liquor production, thus
giving them some independence from patriarchal power—something elite
liberal women lacked. Nevertheless, party ideology did play a role here, as
popular liberals’ construction of the armed citizen limited the public role
popular liberal women could play.
Just as scholars can no longer understand nineteenth–century political history without reference to subalterns, they can also no longer ignore
gender or just state that women were excluded from politics. Likewise,
we must not just leave the story as one of a simplistic all–encompassing
patriarchy that underwrote the male political subject. Gender interacted
with race, class, and partisan ideologies in complex and locally determined
ways to both create male political subjects and open or close possibilities
for women to forge political discourses and practices for themselves.
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